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Abstract
This paper examines the equivalence among price-modifying and quantity
…xing international trade policies in a di¤erential game. We employ two well
known capital accumulation dynamics for …rms, due to Nerlove and Arrow
and to Ramsey, respectively. We show that, in both cases, open-loop and
closed-loop Nash equilibria coincide. Under the former accumulation the
tari¤-quota equivalence holds, but it does not under the latter. Moreover, in
the Ramsey model, the country setting the trade policy prefers a quantity-
equivalent import quota to the adoption of the tari¤.
JEL Classi…cation: D43, D92, F12, F13, L13
Keywords: intra-industry trade, trade policy, di¤erential games, capital
accumulation
1 Introduction
An important question in international trade theory and policy has been,
since a long time, the comparative evaluation of di¤erent trade policies. In
particular, comparing quantity restrictions (such as quotas and voluntary
export restraints) versus price-modifying policies (such as tari¤ and subsidy)
has taken a prominent position in this debate. These two sets of instruments
prove to be equivalent in perfectly competitive markets in the sense that
any e¤ect of a price instrument can be replicated by an appropriately chosen
quantity policy and vice versa. Bhagwati (1965, 1968) noted, however, that
this need not be true when international markets are imperfectly competitive.
Since then, a number of papers have dwelled upon this question, showing that
either the equivalence holds (as in Eaton and Grossman, 1986; and in Hwang
and Mai, 1988, for the Cournot case), or, if it does not, quantity restrictions
tend to rise equilibrium prices (Itoh and Ono, 1982, 1984; Harris, 1985;
Krishna, 1989).1
As Brander (1995) well pointed out, the main limit of the existing liter-
ature on strategic trade policy is, with few exceptions, its essentially static
nature. One-shot static games are clearly not well suited to analyse long-term
interactions characterizing international oligopolistic markets. One may well
expect that introducing real time in these models substantially a¤ects …rms’
behavior.
Cheng (1987), Driskill and McCa¤erty (1989a, 1996) and Dockner and
Haug (1990, 1991) are the few exceptions as they examine trade policies with
oligopolistic …rms interacting in a di¤erential game fashion. In this paper,
we take this avenue and study the equivalence among price-modifying and
quantity-…xing trade policies in a continuous time di¤erential game.
An important di¤erence with the quoted papers is that, following the
literature initiated by Spence (1979), we explicitly model …rms’ dynamic
capital accumulation game. To this end, we will consider both the Nerlove-
Arrow (1962) model of reversible investment (i.e. accumulation with capital
depreciation) and the Ramsey (1928) model (i.e., the well known “corn-corn”
growth model).
Di¤erent strategies and solution concepts may prevail in a di¤erential
game and the existing literature mainly concentrated on two kind of strate-
gies:2 the-open loop and the closed-loop. In the former case, …rms precommit
to an investment path over time and the relevant equilibrium concept is the
open-loop Nash equilibrium. In the latter, …rms do not precommit on invest-
1A ranking of tari¤ and quota policies can be found in Sweeney, Tower and Willett
(1977), for the case where domestic production is monopolised.
2See Kamien and Schwartz (1981); Bas¸ar and Olsder (1982); Mehlmann (1988).
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ment path and their strategies at any instant may depend on all the preceding
history. In this situation, the information set used by …rms in setting their
strategies at any given time is often simpli…ed to be only the current value of
the capital stocks at that time. The relevant equilibrium concept is in this
(sub-)case the closed-loop no-memory (or Markov Perfect) Nash equilibrium.
In order to further simplify the analysis, the above mentioned papers on
international trade di¤erential games have adopted a re…nement of the closed-
loop Nash equilibrium, which is known as the feedback Nash equilibrium.3
In what follows, we will not restrict to this re…nement and deal with the
open-loop and closed loop no-memory solutions. We will study how these
two solution concepts a¤ect the tari¤-quote equivalence of the trade game.
The main results are as follows. Interestingly enough, as it is also shown in
Cellini and Lambertini (2000b), both under the Nerlove-Arrow and the Ram-
sey capital accumulation dynamics, the open-loop Nash equilibrium coincides
with the closed-loop (no-memory) one (and hence it is subgame perfect).
Moreover, under the Nerlove-Arrow accumulation, with quantity-equivalent
import tari¤ and quota, the steady state equilibrium price in the domestic
market is the same under both trade policy regimes. Hence, the tari¤-quota
equivalence holds.
On the contrary, with the Ramsey accumulation, the adoption of any
import quota drives the domestic …rm to the Ramsey equilibrium. This does
not always happen when imposing a tari¤ on imports and the equivalence of
tari¤s and quotas does not hold. Moreover, we show that if the government
setting the trade policy aims at favouring the domestic …rm, and/or lowering
the domestic price, the adoption of a quantity-equivalent import quota is
preferable to the adoption of the tari¤, in that total output is larger under
the former policy than under the latter.
The paper is organized as follows. The general setting is laid out in section
2. Section 3 is devoted to the analysis of the Nerlove-Arrow capital accu-
mulation, while the Ramsey model is investigated in section 4. Concluding
remarks are in section 5.
2 The setup
As in the previous literature on this topic, we consider a duopoly market
supplied by a domestic producer (…rm D) and a foreign rival (…rm F ). For
the sake of simplicity, we assume that …rms sell homogeneous goods, al-
though the ensuing analysis could be easily extended to account for product
3For a clear exposition of the di¤erence among these equilibrium solutions see Bas¸ar
and Olsder (1982, pp. 318-327, and chapter 6, in particular Proposition 6.1).
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di¤erentiation.
The model is built in continuous time. The market exists over t 2 [0 ; 1) :
Let qi(t) de…ne the quantity sold by …rm i, i = D;F; at time t: The marginal
production cost is constant and equal to c for both …rms. Firms compete à
la Cournot, the demand function at time t being:
p(t) = a¡ qD(t)¡ qF (t) : (1)
In order to produce, …rms must accumulate capacity or physical capital ki(t)
over time. In the remainder of the paper, we will investigate two alternative
models of capital accumulation:
A] The Nerlove-Arrow (1962) model, where the relevant dynamic equation
is:
@ki(t)
@t
= Ii(t)¡ ±ki(t) ; (2)
where Ii(t) is the investment carried out by …rm i at time t, and ± is
the constant depreciation rate. The instantaneous cost of investment
is Ci [Ii (t)] = b [Ii (t)]
2 ; with b > 0: To solve this model explicitly,
we also assume that …rms operate with a constant returns technology
qi(t) = ki(t); so that the demand function rewrites as:4
p(t) = a¡ kD(t)¡ kF (t) : (3)
Here, the control variable is the instantaneous investment Ii(t), while
the state variable is obviously ki(t):
B] The Ramsey (1928) model, whit the following dynamic equation:
@ki(t)
@t
= f(ki(t))¡ qi(t)¡ ±ki(t) ; (4)
where f(ki(t)) = yi(t) denotes the output produced by …rm i at time t:
In this case, capital accumulates as a result of intertemporal relocation
of unsold output yi(t)¡qi(t): This can be interpreted in two ways. The
…rst consists in viewing this setup as a corn-corn model, where unsold
output is reintroduced in the production process. The second consists
in thinking of a two-sector economy where there exists an industry
4Notice that this assumption entails that …rms always operate at full capacity. This,
in turn, amounts to saying that this model encompasses the case of Bertrand behaviour
under capacity constraints, as in Kreps and Scheinkman (1983). The open-loop solution
of the Nerlove-Arrow di¤erential duopoly game in a model without trade is in Fershtman
and Muller (1984) and Reynolds (1987).
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producing the capital input which can be traded against the …nal good
at a price equal to one (see Cellini and Lambertini, 1998, 2000a).
In this model, the control variable is qi(t); while the state variable
remains ki(t):
Both in model [A] and in model [B], we address the issue whether the
equivalence of import tari¤ and quota holds. Following Dockner and Haug
(1990), one should check the existence or non-existence of such equivalence
under both open-loop and closed-loop solutions. As we show below, the
present games [A-B] are such that open- and closed-loop equilibria coincide.
3 The Nerlove-Arrow model
In the Nerlove-Arrow model, the Hamiltonian of the domestic …rm writes as
follows:
HD(t) = e¡½t ¢
n
[a¡ kD(t)¡ kF (t)¡ c] kD(t)¡ b [ID (t)]2+ (5)
+¸DD(t) [ID(t)¡ ±kD(t)] + ¸DF (t) [IF (t)¡ ±kF (t)]g
where ¸Di(t) = ¹Di(t)e
½t; and ¹Di(t) is the co-state variable associated to
ki(t); i = D;F:
If the government adopts an import tari¤ ¿ ; the Hamiltonian of the foreign
…rm is:
HF (t) = e¡½t ¢
n
[a¡ kD(t)¡ kF (t)¡ c¡ ¿ ] kF (t)¡ b [IF (t)]2+ (6)
+¸FF (t) [IF (t)¡ ±kF (t)] + ¸FD(t) [ID(t)¡ ±kD(t)]g
First note that, as the tari¤ (directly) a¤ects only the foreign …rm’s pro…t
one cannot rely on symmetry to solve the game.
Necessary conditions for the domestic …rm require
(i)
@HD(t)
@ID(t)
= 0 ) ¡2bID(t) + ¸DD(t) = 0
(ii) ¡ @HD(t)
@kD(t)
¡ @HD(t)
@IF (t)
@IF (t)
@kD(t)
=
@¸DD(t)
@t
¡ ½¸DD(t) )
) ¡@¸DD(t)
@t
+ ½¸DD(t) = a¡ c¡ 2kD(t)¡ kF (t)¡ ±¸DD(t)
(iii) ¡ @HD(t)
@kF (t)
¡ @HD(t)
@IF (t)
@IF (t)
@kF (t)
=
@¸DF (t)
@t
¡ ½¸DF (t)
(iv) lim
t!1 ¹DD(t) ¢ kD(t) = 0 ; limt!1 ¹DF (t) ¢ kF (t) = 0 ;
(7)
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where (iv) is the transversality condition.
Similarly for the foreign …rm
(i)
@HF (t)
@IF (t)
= 0 ) ¡2bIF (t) + ¸FF (t) = 0
(ii) ¡ @HF (t)
@kF (t)
¡ @HF (t)
@ID(t)
@ID(t)
@kF (t)
=
@¸FF (t)
@t
¡ ½¸FF (t) )
) ¡@¸FF (t)
@t
+ ½¸FF (t) = a¡ c¡ 2kF (t)¡ kD(t)¡ ±¸FF (t)¡ ¿
(iii) ¡ @HF (t)
@kD(t)
¡ @HF (t)
@ID(t)
@ID(t)
@kD(t)
=
@¸FD(t)
@t
¡ ½¸FD(t)
(iv) lim
t!1 ¹FF (t) ¢ kF (t) = 0 ; limt!1 ¹FD(t) ¢ kD(t) = 0 ;
(8)
Notice that by (7.i) we have
@Ii(t)
@kj(t)
= 0 for i di¤erent from j: Moreover,
condition (7.iii), which yields @¸DF (t)=@t, is redundant in that ¸DF (t) does
not appear in the …rst order conditions (7.i) and (7.ii). Therefore, the open-
loop solution is indeed a degenerate closed-loop solution.5
Replace (7.i) into (7.ii) obtaining
@¸DD(t)
@t
= bID(t)(½+ ±)¡ [a¡ c¡ 2kD(t)¡ kF (t)] :
Then, di¤erentiating (7.i) w.r.t. time and substituting the previous condition
we obtain
@ID(t)
@t
=
ID(t)(½+ ±)
2
¡ a¡ c¡ 2kD(t)¡ kF (t)
2b
: (9)
Similarly, condition (8.iii) yields @¸FD(t)=@t, is redundant.
The discussion carried out so far establishes:
Proposition 1 Under the Nerlove-Arrow capital accumulation dynamics,
the open-loop Nash equilibrium is subgame perfect.
Now we can explicitly look for steady state points. We obtain
@IF (t)
@t
=
IF (t)(½+ ±)
2
¡ a¡ c¡ kD(t)¡ 2kF (t) + ¿
2b
: (10)
5Note that, however, the open-loop solution does not coincide with the feedback solution
(see Reynolds, 1987). For further details, see Cellini and Lambertini (2000b), as well as
the discussion in Driskill and McCa¤erty (1989b, pp. 326-8). Classes of games where
this coincidence arises are illustrated in Clemhout and Wan (1974); Reinganum (1982);
Mehlmann and Willing (1983); Dockner, Feichtinger and Jørgensen (1985); Fershtman
(1987). For an overview, see Mehlmann (1988); Fershtman, Kamien and Muller (1992).
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Now, solving the system:
@Ii(t)
@t
= 0 ;
@ki(t)
@t
= 0 ; i = D;F; (11)
we calculate the steady state levels of states and controls:
IssD =
± [(a¡ c) (1 + 2b± (½ + ±)) + ¿ ]
3 + 4b±
h
±
³
2 + b±2
´
+ ½
³
2 + 2b±2 + b±½
´i ;
IssF =
± [a¡ c¡ 2 (a¡ c¡ ¿) (1 + b± (½ + ±))]
1¡ 4 [1 + b± (½ + ±)]2 ; (12)
kssD =
IssD
±
; kssF =
IssF
±
:
Steady state capital levels in (12) can be usefully rewritten as:
kssD =
(a¡ c)A+ ¿
A (B + 1)
kssF =
(a¡ c)A¡ ¿B
A (B + 1)
(13)
where
A ´ 2b (½+ ±) + 1 > 0 ;
B ´ 2 [b (½+ ±) ± + 1] > 0 : (14)
Then, from (13) one can easily check that
@kssD
@¿
=
1
A (B + 1)
> 0 ;
@kssF
@¿
= ¡ B
A (B + 1)
< 0 : (15)
In the case of an equivalent import quota, the domestic …rm’s optimiza-
tion problem is
max
ID(t)
HD(t) = e¡½t ¢
nh
a¡ kD(t)¡ kF (t)¡ c
i
kD(t)¡ b [ID (t)]2+ (16)
+¸DD(t) [ID(t)¡ ±kD(t)] + ¸DF (t) [IF (t)¡ ±kF (t)]g
where kF (t) = kssF =
IssF
±
: It is immediate to verify that the …rst order
conditions for the optimum of …rm D coincide with (7).
The above discussion proves the following result:
Proposition 2 Under the Nerlove-Arrow capital accumulation dynamics,
with quantity-equivalent import tari¤ and quota, the steady state equilibrium
price in the domestic market is the same under both trade policy regimes.
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Essentially, the above result is driven by the fact that, in the Nerlove-
Arrow model, there is no strategic interaction in the choice of optimal in-
vestment on the part of …rms, i.e., …rm i’s …rst order condition on investment
(7.i and 8.i) only contain the own control, and not the rival’s. Hence, the
behaviour of …rm D is the same irrespective of the policy adopted by the
home government towards …rm F:
4 The Ramsey model
Under the capital accumulation rule (4), the problem of the domestic …rm is
the following:
HD(t) = e¡½t fqD(t) [a¡ qD(t)¡ qF (t)¡ c] +
+¸DD(t) [f(kD(t))¡ qD(t)¡ ±kD(t)] +
+¸DF (t) [f(kF (t))¡ qF (t)¡ ±kF (t)]g ; (17)
where ¸Di(t) = ¹Di(t)e
½t; and ¹Di(t) is the co-state variable associated to
ki(t):
If the government of the domestic country imposes an import tari¤ ¿; the
Hamiltonian of the foreign …rm is:
HF (t) = e¡½t ¢ fqF (t) [a¡ qD(t)¡ qF (t)¡ c¡ ¿ ] +
+¸FF (t) [f(kF (t))¡ qF (t)¡ ±kF (t)] +
+¸FD(t) [f (kD(t)) ¡ qD(t)¡ ±kD(t)]g : (18)
The …rst order conditions concerning the control variables are:
@HD(t)
@qD(t)
= a¡ 2qD(t)¡ qF (t)¡ c¡ ¸DD(t) = 0 ; (19)
@HF (t)
@qF (t)
= a¡ 2qF (t)¡ qD(t)¡ c¡ ¿ ¡ ¸FF (t) = 0 :
Now look at the generic co-state equation of …rm i; for the closed-loop solution
of the game:
¡@Hi(t)
@ki(t)
¡ @Hi(t)
@qj(t)
@qj(t)
@ki(t)
=
@¹ii(t)
@t
(20)
where
@qj(t)
@ki(t)
= 0 (21)
as it appears from a quick inspection of best replies obtained from (19):
qbrD (t) =
a¡ c¡ qF (t)¡ ¸DD(t)
2
; (22)
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qbrF (t) =
a¡ c¡ ¿ ¡ qD(t)¡ ¸FF (t)
2
: (23)
Moreover, (22) and (23) su¢ce to establish that the co-state equation:
¡@Hi(t)
@kj(t)
¡ @Hi(t)
@qj(t)
@qj(t)
@kj(t)
=
@¹ij(t)
@t
(24)
is indeed redundant since ¹ij(t) = ¸ij(t)e
¡½t does not appear in the …rst
order conditions concerning controls. That is, the Ramsey game yields that
the open-loop solution is a degenerate closed-loop solution because the best
reply function of …rm i does not contain the state variable pertaining to the
same …rm. Therefore, we have proved the analogous to Proposition 1:
Proposition 3 Under the Ramsey capital accumulation dynamics, the open-
loop Nash equilibrium is subgame perfect.
Now move on to the solution of the system. The co-state equation of …rm
i writes as follows:
¡@Hi(t)
@ki(t)
=
@¹ii(t)
@t
) @¸ii(t)
@t
= [½+ ± ¡ f 0(ki(t))]¸ii(t) : (25)
The best reply functions (22-23) can be di¤erentiated w.r.t. time to yield:
dqi(t)
dt
= ¡dqj(t)=dt+ d¸ii(t)=dt
2
: (26)
Then, using
¸DD(t) = a¡ c¡ 2qD(t)¡ qF (t)
¸FF (t) = a¡ c¡ ¿ ¡ qD(t)¡ 2qF (t) (27)
and (25), we obtain:
dqD(t)
dt
=
dqF (t)=dt+ [a¡ c¡ 2qD(t)¡ qF (t)] [½ + ± ¡ f 0(kD(t))]
2
dqF (t)
dt
=
dqD(t)=dt+ [a¡ c¡ ¿ ¡ 2qF (t)¡ qD(t)] [½+ ± ¡ f 0(kF (t))]
2
(28)
which can be solved to yield:
dqD(t)
dt
=
[a¡ c¡ ¿ ¡ 2qF (t)¡ qD(t)] [½+ ± ¡ f 0(kF (t))]
3
+ (29)
¡2 [a¡ c¡ 2qD(t)¡ qF (t)] [½ + ± ¡ f 0(kD(t))]
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dqF (t)
dt
=
[a¡ c¡ 2qD(t)¡ qF (t)] [½+ ± ¡ f 0(kD(t))]
3
+ (30)
¡2 [a¡ c¡ ¿ ¡ 2qF (t)¡ qD(t)] [½+ ± ¡ f
0(kF (t))]
3
Imposing that (29) and (30) be zero and solving, we obtain the following set
of solutions:
f 0(kD(t)) = f 0(kF (t)) = f 0(k(t)) = ½ + ± (31)
and
qssD =
a¡ c+ ¿
3
; qssF =
a¡ c¡ 2¿
3
; (32)
where fqssD ; qssF g is the solution driven by demand and cost conditions, while
f 0(k(t)) = ½ + ± is the Ramsey equilibrium dictated by intertemporal cap-
ital accumulation alone. Note that the optimal outputs in (32) exhibit the
standard properties @qssD =@¿ > 0 and @q
ss
F =@¿ < 0:
The phase diagram illustrating the dynamics of the system is in …gure 1,
where the locus @k=@t = 0 as well as the behaviour of k; depicted by horizon-
tal arrows, derive from (4). Steady states are identi…ed by the intersections
between loci.
Figure 1: Steady state equilibrium under a tari¤
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It is worth noting that the situation illustrated in …gure 1 is only one
out of several possible con…gurations, due to the fact that the position of
the vertical line f 0(k) = ½ + ± is independent of demand parameters, while
the horizontal loci qssD and q
ss
F shifts upwards (downwards) as a (c) increases.
Moreover, @qssD =@¿ > 0 and @q
ss
F =@¿ < 0: Here, we con…ne to the case where
horizontal loci qssD and q
ss
F intersect locus @k=@t = 0 in the region where it
is increasing in k; to the left of the Ramsey equilibrium f 0(k(t)) = ½ + ±:
Such steady state points are identi…ed as L for …rm D and M for …rm F:
Intersections to the right of k = f
0¡1(±) are clearly ine¢cient and therefore
can be disregarded. Stability analysis reveals that fL ; M ; Pg are saddle
points.6
The foregoing discussion can be summarised as follows:
Lemma 1 Under the import tari¤ ¿; for all fa; c; ¿g such that
a¡ c+ ¿
3
· f (kP ) ;
the system reaches a steady state at
qssD =
a¡ c+ ¿
3
; qssF =
a¡ c¡ 2¿
3
;
which is a saddle.
Now we shall take into consideration the alternative setting where the
policy maker of country D adopts an equivalent import quota. The issue can
be quickly dealt with by observing how the best reply of …rm D modi…es the
quota. Now (22) writes as follows:
qbrD (t) =
a¡ c¡ qF ¡ ¸DD(t)
2
; (33)
where qF ´
a¡ c¡ 2¿
3
: It is immediate to verify that
dqD(t)
dt
= ¡d¸DD(t)
dt
= ¡ [½+ ± ¡ f 0(kD(t))]¸DD(t) : (34)
Notice that the above condition holds irrespective of whether the quota is
quantity-equivalent to the tari¤ or not. This situation is illustrated in …gure
2 (the horizontal and vertical arrows describing the dynamics of fk; qg are
omitted).
6The stability analysis is omitted for the sake of brevity. See Cellini and Lambertini
(1998) for an illustration of the symmmetric case.
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Figure 2: Steady state equilibrium under a quota
6
-
qssF
qssD
L
P
q
kP ´ f 0¡1(½+ ±)
k
f 0¡1(±)
This proves the following result:
Lemma 2 Under the Ramsey capital accumulation constraint, the adoption
of any import quota drives the domestic …rm to the Ramsey equilibrium where
f 0(kD(t)) = ½+ ± and qssD = f(kP ):
Hence, if the government of the domestic country aims at (i) favouring
the domestic …rm, and (ii) lowering the domestic price, the adoption of a
quantity-equivalent import quota is preferable to the adoption of the tari¤,
in that total output is larger under the former policy than under the latter.
Lemmata 1-2 produce the main result:
Proposition 4 Under the Ramsey capital accumulation constraint, the do-
mestic price equivalence of tari¤s and quotas does not hold.
5 Conclusions
In this paper, we have analyzed the equivalence among price-modifying and
quantity …xing trade policies in a continuous time di¤erential game. We
have explicitly introduced the …rms’ accumulation dynamics and showed
11
that, in two well known accumulation models, open-loop and closed-loop (no-
memory) Nash equilibria coincide. Under the Nerlove-Arrow (1962) accumu-
lation dynamics, the tari¤-quota equivalence holds, while under the Ramsey
(1928) accumulation dynamics it does not. In the latter case, we have shown
that the trade policy setting country prefers a quantity-equivalent import
quota to the adoption of the tari¤.
The two accumulation schemes used in this paper and a similar analysis
can be employed to deal with voluntary export restraints.7 One could verify
if and when export restraints set at a free trade level may increase pro…ts of
the exporting …rm. This interesting possibility is left for further research.
7See also Dockner and Haug (1991) on this.
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